



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

AFZB-CJ36

10 October 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR General Austin Scott Miller, Commander, Resolute Support /
United States Forces-Afghanistan, APO AE 09356

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation, Green-on-Blue Attack, on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Maiwand,
Afghanistan, 3 September 2018

1. (U//FOUO) **Background.** On 13 September 2018, you appointed me as an Investigating Officer (IO) pursuant to AR 15-6. The purpose of the investigation was to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the Green-on-Blue Attack, on FOB Maiwand, Afghanistan, 3 September 2018.

2. (U//FOUO) **Summary.** On 3 September 2018, a Green-on-Blue attack at FOB Maiwand resulted in the death of CSM Timothy Bolyard of Headquarters, 3rd Squadron, 1st Security Forces Assistance Brigade (3/1 SFAB) and the wounding of (b)(3), (b)(6) of C Company, Task Force 1-28 IN (C/1-28). Members of 3/1 SFAB and C/1-28 participated in an Elections Security Shura (hereafter "Shura") on FOB Maiwand at the office of BG Muhammad Raziq, Commander of 4th Brigade, 203rd Corps (4/203rd). At approximately 1210 on 3 September 2018, a shooter fired upon the group while they headed to the Afghan National Army (ANA) Dining Facility (DFAC).

3. (U//FOUO) **Overview.** I received the Appointment Memorandum on 13 September 2018. I contacted and met my legal advisor (b)(2), (b)(6) for general procedural guidance regarding the conduct of the investigation during the evening of 13 September 2018. From 14-15 September 2018, I reviewed the appointment memorandum, AR 15-6 Chapters 3 and 5 and coordinated transportation to FOB Dahlke West. I traveled to FOB Dahlke West on 16 September 2018 with (b)(3), (b)(6) and commenced the investigation that day. I conducted witness interviews from 16-20 September 2018. During the course of this investigation, I gathered sworn statements, email documentation, and pictures of the incident location. I completed my findings and recommendations on 10 October 2018.

4. (U//FOUO) **Summary of Relevant & Material Facts - Pre-Attack**

(U//FOUO) **Security Shura Date Change.** (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) for (b)(3), (b)(6) received a phone call from BG Raziq on the evening of 2 September 2018. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 23). BG Raziq called to inform (b)(3), (b)(6) that the Shura was being rescheduled from 4 September 2018 to 3 September 2018. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 23). 3/1 SFAB and 4/203rd Corps are partnered units for Train, Advise, Assist (TAA) missions. BG Raziq later stated he wanted to

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change the Shura date because he had received information indicating there was an imminent threat in Logar and he wanted to conduct the meeting to ensure their security posture was elevated. (Exhibit 29).

b. (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) *Mission Coordination.* At approximately 1945, on 2 September 2018, the Security Forces (SECFOR) platoon from C Company, Task Force (TF) 1-28 conducted pre-mission coordination in preparation for the 3 September 2018 mission. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 23, 28). TF 1-28 (b)(1)1.

(b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits 1, 3, 10, 12, 13, 15, 23, 28). FOB Maiwand is the (b)(1)1.4a base of 3/1 SFAB. (b)(1)1.4a were assigned to provide interior and exterior personal security: (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) on in the interior and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) on the exterior. (Exhibits 3, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 27, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) were mounted; (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were dismounted. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28).

c. (~~U//FOUO~~) *Pre-Mission Brief.* From approximately 0830-0900 on 3 September 2018, the 3/1 SFAB command team, staff, and TF 1-28 personnel participated in a pre-mission brief at FOB Dahlke. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 15, 28). The brief addressed current intelligence reporting, threat template, radio frequencies, and each element's task and purpose. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 23, 28). Attendees included all GA and SECFOR personnel named above and the following TAA Advisors: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28). At the conclusion of the brief, all participants moved by vehicle convoy from FOB Dahlke to Advisor Platform (AP) CASA (Crusher and Stallion Area). (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 28). AP CASA is a small US-controlled base adjacent to FOB Maiwand that 3/1 SFAB Advisors use as a base of operations for their TAA missions. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28).

d. (~~U//FOUO~~) *Arrival at AP CASA.* At approximately 0930, all personnel arrived at AP CASA. (Exhibits 1, 3, 12, 13, 28). TAA Advisors (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3) (b)(6) and (b)(6) were already at AP CASA when the convoy arrived. (Exhibits 1, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28). Although all GA and SECFOR personnel remained in their personal protective equipment (PPE, which includes helmet and body armor), (b)(3), (b)(6) authorized all Advisors to downgrade their PPE for purposes of attending the Shura. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28). All GA, SECFOR, and Advisors carried their assigned duty weapons, regardless of their PPE posture. (Exhibits 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 28). Interviewees stated that downgrading PPE was typical for Advisors while conducting their TAA mission, symbolizing and establishing trust between themselves and their Afghan partners. (Exhibits 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) made a calculated command decision not to wear PPE to

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the Shura location based on threat, risk, mitigations (proper amount of GA and SECFOR), culture sensitivities, and previous guidance and discussion with the SFA5 Commander, BG Scott Jackson. (Exhibit 3).

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) *Advisor Travel from AP CASA to the Shura.* The Shura took place in BG Raziq's office, approximately 300-400 meters, or a three to four-minute walk from AP CASA. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 28). As outlined in Figure 1, advisor personnel, which included (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(7)a walked from AP CASA to the Shura, as US personnel often did when conducting TAA missions. (Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28). No one observed anything unusual during the walk and GA and SECFOR personnel maintained 360-degree security for the duration of the walk. (Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28).

(b)(1)1.4a

(S//~~REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~) *Figure 1: FOB Maiwand and AP CASA.*


f. (S//~~REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~) *Mounted Travel from AP CASA to the Shura.* While the Advisors walked, SECFOR personnel, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6), drove in their MaxxPro, parking on the northeast side of a

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concrete pad next to the Shura site. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28). A (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a Once positioned,
they established security. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted while (b)(3), (b)(6)
remained in the driver seat and (b)(3), (b)(7)a remained in the gunner's turret. As
depicted in Figures 2 and 3 below. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28).



(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA) Figure 2: SECFOR MaxxPro arrives at the Shura site.

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(b)(1)1.4a

(~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) *Figure 3 View of Shura location from concrete pad.*

g. (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) *Arrival of the ANP and NDS personnel.* (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(Exhibit 29).

h. (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) *Beginning of the Shura.* At approximately 1000, the Advisors and GAs arrived first at the Shura. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28). The SECFOR MaxxPro was the only vehicle present on the concrete pad. Nothing unusual was observed outside of the Shura location. (Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 28).

(~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) *Conduct of the Shura inside BG Raziq's office.*

(b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) accompanied by (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) entered BG Raziq's office. (Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 28). BG Raziq, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4c were already present in the office. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28).

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(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) At approximately 1015, other Afghan key leaders and their personal security details (PSD) arrived in three HMMWVs and at least two non-tactical vehicles (NTVs), each with a mounted crew-served weapon. (Exhibits 1, 3, 12, 28, 29). The key leaders were (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6) . (Exhibits 1, 3, 12, 13, 28, 29).

(2) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) The Afghan leaders' PSDs remained outside. (Exhibits 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28, 29). According to COL Abdul Yousufazi, 203rd Corps Counter Intelligence Commander, PSD personnel are strictly forbidden from carrying weapons to shura when U.S. Advisors are present. However, BG Raziq allowed the ANP and NDS PSDs to enter with their weapons. (Exhibit 29) No one inside the Shura was armed, other than US personnel. (Exhibits 3, 23, 29).

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(3)

(~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) *Figure 4: Inside the Shura.*

(3) (~~U//FOUO~~) The ANP do not usually attend shuras on FOB Maiwand, however, they were invited to the Shura due to the ANP's large role in elections

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security. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28, 29). Their presence resulted in a greater than normal number of people in BG Raziq's office and thus (b)(3), (b)(6) sent (b)(6) and (b)(6) (b)(6) outside to reduce overcrowding. (Exhibits 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28, 29). (b)(3), (b)(5) remained in the room to conduct simultaneous interpretation for the U.S. personnel. (Exhibits 3, 4, 11, 28). The Shura lasted approximately two hours, typical of shuras on FOB Maiwand. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28). Witnesses noticed that Afghans entered and exited the room during the Shura, which was reasonable considering the meeting did not have scheduled breaks. (Exhibits 13, 28). No U.S. personnel entered or exited during the meeting. (Exhibits 13, 28).

(4) (U//FOUO) Most of the conversations during the Shura focused on election security in Logar and Wardak provinces. (Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 28, 29). No witnesses reported any tension or arguments between U.S. personnel and their Afghan partners. (Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14). NDS personnel joked with ANASOC personnel about equipment and security shortfalls among the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF). (Exhibits 4, 13, 28). This type of joking was typical among ANDSF and did not raise concern with U.S. personnel. (Exhibits 4, 13, 28).

j. (U//FOUO) *Conduct outside of the Shura.* (b)(6) was outside of the Shura location, noting activities and conversations among the ANDSF, as outlined in Figure 5. (Exhibit 11). He commented on the number of PSD accompanying the Afghan leaders, indicating that their numbers were greater than previous shuras. (Exhibits 11, 28). As previously mentioned, the presence of the ANP increased the number of attendees.

(b)(6) overheard boastful conversations between various ANDSF personnel, typical of soldiers and security guards making small talk. (Exhibit 11). (b)(6) did not overhear any threatening conversations towards US personnel, nor did he observe any unusual behavior that caused him any safety concern. (Exhibit 11).

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

~~(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)~~ Figure 5: AN SDF vehicles outside.

(1) (U//FOUO) Through a window (b)(3), (b)(6) saw ANDSF personnel outside, standing around, talking, and using cell phones. He noted it was normal for Afghans to use their phones during meetings. Nothing he observed through the window caused him any safety concerns. (Exhibits 13, 28).

k. ~~(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)~~ Security during the Shura.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28). In addition to their duty weapons,

(b)(1)1.4a

(Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(7)a provided GA security just outside BG Raziq's office. (Exhibits 3, 7, 8, 9). (b)(3), (b)(6) provided GA security in the hallway outside the entrance to the office. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) provided personal GA security to the advisors within the Shura. (Exhibits 3, 7, 8, 9, 27).

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(b)(1)1.4a

~~(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)~~ Figure 6: All security inside and outside.

I. (U//FOUO) *Shura conclusion, movement to lunch.* The Shura concluded at approximately 1150 and BG Raziq invited attendees to lunch at the ANA DFAC. (Exhibits, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, 28). Though lunch was not part of 3/1 SFAB's plan, they expected BG Raziq would invite them to lunch as he usually did so following meetings. (Exhibits, 3, 12, 28) U.S. personnel split into two groups based on who needed to use the latrine prior to lunch. Group 1, going directly to lunch, consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SECFOR (b)(3), (b)(6) and GA (b)(3), (b)(6). (Exhibits, 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 13, 14, 27, 28). Group 2, using the latrine before lunch, consisted of CSM Bolyard, (b)(3), (b)(6) GAs (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and SECFOR (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6). (Exhibits, 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 16, 28).

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(b)(1)1.4a

~~(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)~~ Figure 7: Movement to lunch.

(1) (U//FOUO) Upon exiting EO Raziq's office, (b)(3), (b)(6) observed the NDS and ANP vehicles on the concrete pad. All vehicles had their crew-served mounted weapons pointed skyward. (Exhibits 13, 28). Afghan PSD typically point their weapons skyward when their vehicles were stationary. (Exhibits 28, 29).

(2) (U//FOUO) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) observed the ANP get into their vehicles to leave after the meeting concluded. (Exhibits 7, 11, 28). (b)(6) overhead NDS personnel ask the ANP if they were going to lunch. The ANP replied that they were not going to lunch and were returning to their base. (Exhibits 11, 28).

5. (U//FOUO) **Summary of Relevant & Material Facts - The Attack**

a. (U//FOUO) *Green on Blue Incident.* The Green on Blue incident occurred while US personnel walked from the Shura toward the DFAC. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28). Both groups walked past the Afghan PSDs and remaining vehicles parked on the concrete pad. Witnesses described the walking path to the DFAC as narrow and surrounded on both sides by shipping containers and T-walls. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28).

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(b)(1)1.4a

~~(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)~~ Figure 8: Entrance of walking path DFAC.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

~~(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)~~ Figure 9: Pathway between Shura location and DFAC, site of Point of Impact.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Group 1 (~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~) and ~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~), accompanied by BG Raziq, the NDS Chief of Staff, and the PCOP,

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began walking south on the path toward the DFAC at approximately 1205. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 8, 27, 28). Group 1 had just been seated in the VIP section of the DFAC when they heard a gunshot followed by a burst of gunfire. Hearing the gunfire, Group 1 moved toward the DFAC door. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 8, 27, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) overheard Afghans say that an American was down and relayed this information to Group 1. (Exhibit 4). Group 1 exited the DFAC, took cover behind a T-wall barrier, and established security. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 8, 27, 28). Group 1 members could not positively identify (PID) the shooter or the origin of the fire.

(2) (U//FOUO) Group 2 (CSM Bolyard, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) began walking south on the path toward the DFAC at approximately 1210. (Exhibits 6, 7, 11, 16, 28). They were within approximately 60 meters of the DFAC entrance when they heard gunfire. Group 2 reacted by finding cover. (Exhibits 6, 7, 11, 16, 28). No member of the group could return fire, as they did not have PID of the shooter or the origin of the fire. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 20, 21, 23, 28).

(3) (U//FOUO) Most Group 2 members took cover between nearby containers during the initial gunfire. (Exhibits 6, 7, 11, 16, 28). However, CSM Bolyard and (b)(3), (b)(6) were shot while moving to cover. Witnesses observed CSM Bolyard draw his pistol, turn around toward the Shura site, and then turn back south toward the DFAC before falling to the ground. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) was able to take cover after being shot. He later learned that the bullet struck his helmet. Although it did not fully penetrate his helmet, the impact was strong enough for him to believe he had been wounded. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 28, 35). (b)(6) stated he saw one of the PSD personnel firing a PKM machine gun upwards into the air. No other interviewee could confirm this observation. (Exhibits 11, 28).

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(b)(1)1.4a

~~(S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)~~ Figure 10: The shooting.

(4) (U//FOUO) After the gunfire ceased, GA and SECFOR from both groups conducted security sweeps throughout their sectors of fire. (Exhibits 3, 4, 8, 13, 27, 28). At approximately 1212, (b)(3), (b)(6) called the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at AP CASA via radio to report troops in contact, request a medic, and request assistance from the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). (Exhibits 1, 3, 15, 28). Responding personnel at AP CASA determined foot travel was the fastest way to the incident site since vehicles have to go around the perimeter of FOB Maiwand and that narrow paths and streets would further impede vehicle movement. (Exhibits 10, 28).

b. (U//FOUO) *Medical Treatment.* After the gunfire ceased and the groups established security, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) rendered first aid to CSM Bolyard. Their examination of CSM Bolyard identified an entry wound on his back with no exit wound. They sealed the wound using materials from an Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) and continued combat lifesaving (CLS) measures until a medic arrived. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 28, 34).

(1) (U//FOUO) At approximately 1216, the QRF arrived at the incident site. (b)(3), (b)(6) at AP CASA, arrived with the QRF. He took over medical aid, quickly evaluated (b)(3), (b)(6) and then treated CSM Bolyard. (Exhibits 1, 3, 6, 10, 12, 13,

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28). Having stabilized CSM Bolyard as much as possible, Advisors and GAs placed him on a medical litter and transported him back to AP CASA. (Exhibits 3, 6, 10, 12, 13, 28). The remaining US personnel also moved from FOB Maiwand to AP CASA. Afghan medics offered additional assistance but US personnel had already administered appropriate aid. (Exhibit 28).

(2) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) At approximately 1220, the (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 20, 21, 23, 28). (b)(1)1.4a CSM Bolyard to the Forward Surgical Team (FST) on FOB Dahlke-West. (Exhibits 1, 3, 12, 13, 20, 21, 23, 28).

(3) (~~U//FOUO~~) At approximately 1221, the QRF returned to AP CASA and loaded CSM Bolyard into a MaxxPro and then transported him to the FST. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) performed CPR on CSM Bolyard enroute to the FST. (Exhibits 6, 10, 34).

(4) (~~U//FOUO~~) At 1228 hours, the MaxxPro arrived at the FST. Surgical and medical staff performed more advanced procedures in an attempt to resuscitate CSM Bolyard. The (b)(3), (b)(6) pronounced CSM Bolyard's death at 1324. (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 28, 34).

6. (~~U//FOUO~~) **Summary of Relevant & Material Facts - Post-Attack**

a. (~~U//FOUO~~) *Unit Actions Following the Green-on-Blue Incident.* Immediately following the incident, AP CASA was placed on lockdown status to ensure no one entered or exited. In addition, all sensitive equipment, to include weapons and night vision devices, were removed. (Exhibits 2, 3, 12, 13, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) had (b)(3), (b)(6) contact BG Raziq to instruct him to lock down FOB Maiwand; BG Raziq said he would comply. (Exhibits 3, 4, 28).

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits 2, 3, 13, 20, 21, 23, 28).

(2) (~~U//FOUO~~) By approximately 1245, all 3/1 SFAB personnel returned to FOB Dahlke. Two squads of SECFOR remained at AP CASA for an incident debriefing at approximately 1435. One squad remained overnight for security. (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 20, 21, 23, 28).

(3) (~~U//FOUO~~) At approximately 1630, one squad of SECFOR moved back to FOB Dahlke. The 3/1 SFAB (b)(3), (b)(7)a led an incident debriefing at the 3/1

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SFAB TOC for all personnel involved in the shooting. (Exhibits 1, 3, 13, 28). During this debriefing, the (b)(3), (b)(6) identified eyewitnesses and other key personnel in preparation for the inbound Joint Casualty Assessment Team (JCAT) and behavioral health specialist. Upon the conclusion of the debriefing, Soldiers were released for the day. (Exhibit 28).

(4) (U//FOUO) At approximately 1850, BG Raziq contacted (b)(3), (b)(6) to inform (b)(3), (b)(6) that the ANA had captured four ANP officers who were the alleged perpetrators of the shooting. (Exhibits 1 2, 3, 4, 12, 13, 28).

(5) (U//FOUO) (b)(6) assigned to 3/1 SFAB, worked with the ANP to collect evidence (b)(6) who TAAs the PCOP and his ANP officers. (b)(6) (b)(6) ANP contacts gave him three weapons, five cell phones, and six SIM cards they had recovered. (Exhibits 5, 28, 29, 30). (b)(6) gave the cell phones and SIM cards to the Counter-Intelligence (CI) team for exploitation before returning them to the ANP. The next day, he transported the weapons and (b)(3), (b)(6) helmet to the Afghanistan Captured Material Exploitation (ACME) lab for forensic analysis. (Exhibits 5, 28, 29, 30, 42). (b)(1)1.4a

7. (U//FOUO) **Pre-Attack Findings.** After carefully considering the evidence, I find that:

a. (U//FOUO) What was the original purpose and scope of the elections security Shura? Was it changed? If so, who changed the mission, scope, or purpose? Why?

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a There was no change to what was discussed during the Shura. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28). On 2 September 2018, BG Raziq informed (b)(3), (b)(6) that he needed to reschedule the Shura from 4 September 2018 to 3 September 2018. (Exhibits 3, 4, 28).

(b)(1)1.4d

(Exhibit 29).

b. (U//FOUO) Identify the U.S. and non-U.S. personnel who attended the Shura. Did the alleged perpetrators attend the Shura? Did anyone attend the Shura who was not anticipated to attend during mission planning? If so, who, and what was the purpose of their attendance?

(1) (U//FOUO) The U.S. personnel in attendance were the (b)(3), (b)(6) CSM Bolyard, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) The Non-U.S. personnel in attendance were (b)(6) BG

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Raziq, (b)(6) (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28, 29). Normally, the ANP do not attend shuras at FOB Maiwand, but BG Raziq invited them since they are heavily involved with the election security. (Exhibits 3, 28). The perpetrators were part of the (b)(6) PSD; they did not sit in the actual Shura, but stayed outside on the concrete pad by their vehicles. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 28).

c. (U//FOUO) Did anyone exhibit suspicious behaviors or insider threat (IT) indicators at the shura? If so, who? How did the U.S. and non-U.S. personnel respond to any suspicious behavior or any insider threat (IT) indicators?

(1) (U//FOUO) None of the witnesses noticed any suspicious behaviors or insider threat indicators during the Shura. Nothing out of the ordinary occurred, and the Shura proceeded as previous shuras had. No one reported tensions or arguments between U.S. personnel and their Afghan partners. (Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28). NDS personnel joked with ANASOC personnel about equipment and security shortfalls among the ANDSF, however, it was believed this, and other joking among ANDSF was within cultural norms. This did not raise any concern with U.S. personnel. (Exhibits 4, 11, 14, 28).

d. (U//FOUO) Did all non-U.S. personnel properly go through biometrics enrollment and Counter Intelligence (CI) vetting process prior to attending the Shura? What were the results of the biometric enrollment and CI screening? Did the unit have access to the information provided by the biometric enrollment or CI screening? Specifically, did the perpetrators properly go through a biometric enrollment and CI vetting process prior to attending the Shura and what information did that provide regarding their background? Did the unit have access to the information, if any, provided by the biometric enrollment and CI screening of the perpetrators?

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(2) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(Exhibit 29, 32) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(3) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(Exhibit 29).

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(Exhibit 3).

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(Exhibits 19, 29)

e. (U//FOUO) Prior to the attack, what was known at the unit level regarding the threat level? When was the threat level last evaluated and by whom? Were there any mitigation measures in place for this specific mission? If so, what were the mitigation measures? Was the evaluation of the threat level consistent with applicable policies and procedures?

(1) (U//FOUO) Prior to the attack the threat level was moderate, with no known or reported incidents of Green on Blue in historical reporting at FOB Maiwand. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 19, 28). During the pre-mission brief, there were reports of a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(Exhibits 7, 8, 15, 23). It was also

briefed that the most likely enemy course of action would be indirect fire, with the most dangerous enemy course of action being an insider attack. (Exhibits 3, 7, 8, 15, 17, 28).

(2) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

(Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 21,

28).

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(3) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) All force protection measures were in place based on approved CONOP Level 0, Tier 1 advising. (Exhibits 3, 19, 26, 28). (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits 3, 21, 23, 26, 28, 31, 36). The threat level evaluation was consistent with applicable policies and procedures including RS SOPs 00331 and 00333.

f. (U//FOUO) Were any risk assessments made? Did the unit put measures in place based on the risk assessment to meet the minimum force protection (FP) standards? If not, why not?

(1) (U//FOUO) The risk assessment is part of the approved CONOP, and is also constantly reviewed by the command team and the S2. (Exhibits 3, 6, 28, 43). The

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mitigation measures mentioned in paragraph 7(e) were in place and met the minimum force protection standards according to RS SOPs 00331 and 00333.

g. (U//FOUO) What training did the advisors and members of TF 1-28 receive prior to deployment and during their deployment to help mitigate the risk of I attacks?

(1) (U//FOUO) Both Advisors and members of TF 1-28 trained extensively on countering Insider Threats during the pre-deployment training conducted both at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and at home station at Fort Benning. This training included extensive GA training, advanced marksmanship training, and advanced situational awareness training. The units received numerous briefs from AWG and other agencies describing insider threats and techniques to counter it. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 20, 21, 23, 28, 31, 33 38). Insider threats are the number one risk associated with the TAA mission and was constantly discussed and trained for throughout the deployment as it was also considered the enemy's most dangerous course of action for every mission and location. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28).

h. (U//FOUO) What operational orders, policies, and directives, not already discussed in the answers above, were applied to this specific mission? Did U.S. forces comply with these order, policies, and directives? If you determine they did not comply, explain in detail.

(1) (U//FOUO) 3/1 SFAB applied numerous SOPs including RS and unit SOP's, including RS SOP 00331 and RS SOP 00333 and the 3/1 SFAB GA and SECFOR internal SOP. (Exhibit 31, 39, 43). All personnel wore their PPE, body armor, and helmet while traveling from FOB Dahike to FOB Maiwand. RS SOP 331, Annex A, states that personal PPE and weapon must be to hand, or immediately available at Tier Level 1 advising sites. (Exhibit 43). The 3/1 SFAB GA and SECFOR SOP states that personnel may downgrade all PPE once inside an engagement but will maintain their PPE and weapon within arm's reach at all times. (Exhibit 31).

(2) (U//FOUO) (b)(3), (b)(6) deviated from these policies when he authorized the Advisors to remove and leave their PPE at AP CASA prior to walking the 400m to the Shura. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) made a calculated command decision not to wear PPE to the Shura based on threat, risk, mitigations (proper GA and SECFOR to Advisor ratios, culture sensitivities, and previous guidance and discussion with the SFAB Commander, BG Jackson. (Exhibit 3).

i. (U//FOUO) Was the overall FP posture appropriate for the situation? In discussing this question, comment on the role of Guardian Angels and their training in relation to both SFAB and TF 1-28, as well as other precautions taken.

(1) (U//FOUO) The overall FP posture was appropriate. (b)(3), (b)(6) made the calculated decision not to wear PPE to the Shura based upon the level of threat, risk,

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and various mitigations emplaced, while considering safety of personnel and the cultural sensitivities of the Afghan partners. (Exhibit 3). Commanders make the determination of appropriate GA to Advisor ratio based on threat level, risk, and mitigations emplaced. The number of GA and SECFOR was appropriate and in compliance with RS SOP 00331 and 00333. All personnel received extensive pre-deployment training and all GAs and SECFOR personnel conduct training at the squad level weekly and at the platoon level monthly. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 20). Appropriate precautions were taken, as discussed in paragraph 7(e).

8. (U//FOUO) **Attack Findings.** After carefully considering the evidence, I find that:

a. (U//FOUO) How did the attack happen? Include the facts and circumstances that immediately led up to the attack.

(1) (U//FOUO) The Green on Blue incident occurred while U.S. personnel walked from the Shura toward the DFAC. Both groups walked past the Afghan PSDs and remaining vehicles parked on the concrete pad. The walking path to the DFAC is narrow and surrounded on both sides by shipping containers and T-walls. (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 28). Paragraph 5, "Summary of Relevant & Material Facts - Attack" of this memorandum fully discusses the attack.

b. (U//FOUO) Describe the facts and circumstances of the death of CSM Bolyard. Include where the shot came from and any personal protective equipment (PPE) / body armor he was wearing at the time of the attack. Was CSM Bolyard's individual force protection status appropriate?

(1) (U//FOUO) CSM Bolyard was attacked as he walked with the second group to the DFAC. He was shot while moving to cover. Witnesses observed CSM Bolyard draw his pistol, turn around toward the Shura, and then turn back south toward the DFAC before falling to the ground. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12, 13, 28). CSM Bolyard received a single gunshot wound to the back, which did not have an exit wound. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) determined that this wound caused CSM Bolyard's death. (Exhibits 22, 34).

(2) (U//FOUO) The shots came from the direction of the ANP PSD, located on the concrete pad slightly northeast of where CSM Bolyard was attacked. CSM Bolyard was not wearing any of his PPE or body armor. (b)(3), (b)(6) approved Advisors to move without body armor after considering the environment and all the previously mentioned mitigation and force protection measures in place. (Exhibit 3). CSM Bolyard's individual force protection status was appropriate under these circumstances.

c. (U//FOUO) Describe the facts and circumstances, and nature of injuries sustained by (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(1) (U//FOUO) (b)(3), (b)(6) was also with the second group walking to the DFAC when the attack occurred. Witnesses believe that (b)(3), (b)(6) was hit while moving to cover. It was later determined that a bullet struck (b)(3), (b)(6) the helmet at the back of his head. Although the bullet did not fully penetrate his helmet, the impact was strong enough for him to believe he had been shot and wounded. The impact of the round indented the back of the helmet and caused a (b)(6).
(b)(6) (Exhibits 3, 10, 12, 22, 28, 25)

d. (U//FOUO) How did the unit respond to the attack? Did the unit follow proper TTPs, SOPs, and directives?

(1) (U//FOUO) Immediately following the attack, everyone found covered positions and tried to determine who was shooting and where it was coming from. All the SECFOR and GAs found covered positions from which to secure the personnel who rendered aid to CSM Bolyard. Neither Group 1 nor Group 2 members could PID the shooter(s) or the origin of fire, so no one returned fire. (Exhibits 3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 15, 28). After the gunfire ceased, GA and SECFOR from both groups conducted security sweeps throughout their sectors of fire, while Advisors continued to give aid to CSM Bolyard. (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 28). All SECFOR, GA, and Advisors followed proper TTPs, SOPs, and directives. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that indiscriminate return fire would have made an already tragic scene worse and would have caused negative strategic impacts. (Exhibit 3).

e. (U//FOUO) What FP measures were taken by U.S. forces present at the scene?

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(Exhibits 3,

6, 7, 12, 13, 15, 28). SECFOR and GAs secured the area immediately surrounding CSM Bolyard once the firing ceased. SECFOR and GAs continued to scan the area for the shooter(s) or a possible follow-on attack. (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 28). Accountability and reporting of the incident to the CASA JOC also occurred immediately after the firing ceased. After initial aid was given to CSM Bolyard, (b)(3), (b)(6) determined CSM Bolyard needed to be evacuated immediately. Those not carrying CSM Bolyard via medical litter provided security during the foot movement back to AP CASA. (Exhibits 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 28).

f. (U//FOUO) How many perpetrators were part of the attack? Describe their appearance and affiliation, if any, with Afghan National Defense Forces (ANDSF) military or police forces. Include all information currently known about the perpetrators.

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

that was located on the concrete pad. Mir Wali and Javed Noorduiddin attacked and shot the U.S.

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personnel. Atiq Ullah and Mohammed Farooq are suspected accomplices, drivers, who assisted the shooters to depart the area. (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(Exhibit 29)

g. (U//FOUO) What was the method of attack? Discuss how the perpetrators gained access to the Afghan National Army (ANA) FOB and how they obtained a vehicle.

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d Javed Nooruddin fired approximately 3-4 rounds first, immediately followed by Mir Wali firing two bursts of approximately 4-6 rounds each toward the U.S. personnel. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(Exhibits 29, 30).

h. (U//FOUO) Identify U.S. and other witnesses to the attack. Did the witness recognize the perpetrators? Do any of the witnesses know the individuals who committed the attack? Do any of the witnesses know why the individuals committed the attack?

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) Paragraph 7(b) above contains the names to the U.S. and non-U.S. personnel who attended the Shura and that witnessed the attack. However, none of them could PID the shooter(s) or exactly where the shots were being fired. (Exhibit 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 28). Mohammed Sabir, ANA Soldier, is the sole one eyewitness to the actual shooting. He recounts that Javed Nooruddin fired his AK-47 rifle first, then Mir Wali fired the PKM. Both ANP fired in the direction of the group of SFAB senior leaders as they walked to the DFAC. (Exhibit 29). No one recognized the shooters or knew the individuals who committed the attack. None of the witnesses knew why the attack was committed.

9. (U//FOUO) **Post-Attack Findings.** After carefully considering the evidence, I find that:

a. (U//FOUO) What was the immediate response of U.S. Forces following the attack?

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

It was quickly noticed that CSM Bolyard had been shot and was lying on the ground. (Exhibit 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 28). (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately began buddy aid on CSM Bolyard. (Exhibit 6, 12). The other Advisors, SECFOR, and GAs secured the area. Soldiers on

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the ground reported the incident to the AP CASA JOC, called for QRF, and for casualty evacuation of CSM Bolyard. (Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 28). Accountability and status check of each individual also commenced.

(2) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) A small QRF, comprised of including a (b)(3), (b)(6) and a small security force, arrived from AP CASA arrived and bolstered the security around CSM Bolyard. (Exhibits 3, 10, 12, 13, 28). They quickly determined that CSM Bolyard needed to be evacuated to the FST for further treatment and that movement by foot to AP CASA would be quickest. (Exhibits 3, 10, 12, 13, 28). Upon their arrival at AP CASA, CSM Bolyard was transported via MAXXPLO to the FST on Dahlke-East. A larger QRF, consisting of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and approximately (b)(1). Soldiers, arrived at AP CASA from FOB Dahlke-West to further enhance security around AP CASA. (Exhibits 20, 23, 28)

b. (U//FOUO) What actions did the perpetrators take immediately following the attack?

(1) (U//FOUO) Following the incident, all four perpetrators got in their vehicles and successfully departed FOB Maiwand and returned to the NDS Compound. Soon after arriving at the NDS Compound, they were directed to return to FOB Maiwand. (Exhibit 29). No witnesses could identify who directed them to return. Some accounts indicate that the perpetrators never actually made it back to the NDS compound. (Exhibit 29). Most of the Afghan leaders stated they did not know if they left FOB Maiwand because they were too busy dealing with the situation and trying to figure out what happened. (b)(6)

(b)(3) both stated that the perpetrators in fact departed FOB Maiwand. (Exhibit 29). (b)(3), (b)(6) further claims that ANA escorts rode with the perpetrators on their return from the NDS compound back to FOB Maiwand, to ensure they did not escape. (Exhibit 29).

c. (U//FOUO) How were the perpetrators apprehended? Describe the facts and circumstances surrounding how the perpetrators were identified.

(1) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(Exhibit 28, 29).

(2) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~) (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(Exhibit 29).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(Exhibits 28, 29).

d. (U//FOUO) Discuss all information currently known about the perpetrators, including what the motive was behind the attack.

(1) (S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(4)

(2) (S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)

(b)(1)1.4

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d (Exhibits 28, 29).

(3) (S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

28, 29).

(Exhibits

(4) (S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

(Exhibits 28, 29).

(5) (S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4d

28, 29).

(Exhibits

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(6) (~~S//REL USA, NATO, RSMA~~)

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4c

(Exhibits 28, 29).

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) What was the reaction of the ANDSF military and police forces? Describe their cooperation with any investigation regarding this attack.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) The ANDSF's immediate reaction was the same as the U.S. Forces; they sought cover until the firing stopped before assessing the situation as well as trying to identify the shooter(s) and from where the shooting originated. U.S. Forces stated that both the ANA and ANP were mostly standing around and did nothing to help during the immediate aftermath. (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17). An ANA Soldier located next to the DFAC helped secure the area where CSM Bolyard was receiving buddy aid. (Exhibits 14, 28, 29).

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) After the incident, both BG Raziq and COL Abdali discussed the incident with each other and determined that the ANP PSD personnel were the perpetrators. COL Abdali claims that he told the four ANP not to touch their weapons but he says he is unsure if they left FOB Maiwand because he was busy working with BG Raziq to deal with the situation. BG Raziq claims that the perpetrators were not allowed to depart FOB Maiwand, but all four and several other ANA personnel, stated they left the FOB. (Exhibit 29).

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) All the key ANA and ANP leaders present during the Shura stated that they would fully cooperate with any investigation. BG Raziq, COL Abdali, COL Mohammed, the NDS Chief of Staff, and several other of the ANA leaders were interviewed by the JCAT. (Exhibit 29). (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the ANA and NDS have actively cooperated with the investigation, agreed to multiple increased security measures, and show great remorse following the incident. (b)(3), (b)(6) has had very little interaction with the ANP following the incident, which is not out of the ordinary, since they do not normally interact with the ANP. (Exhibit 3).

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) COL Abdali has cooperated by submitting to an interview and ensuring the perpetrators were identified and investigated. He also turned over the PKM and two AK-47s, one of which was alleged to have been used in the incident, to (b)(1) for ballistic analysis and forensic testing. (Exhibits 5, 29, 30).

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) What medical treatment, if any, did CSM Bolyard receive? Include specific details related to the medical assistance provided at the scene and where he was taken after the incident.

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(1) (U//FOUO) CSM Bolyard was identified as a casualty immediately after he was attacked. (b)(3), (b)(7)a and (b)(3), (b)(6) provided him with initial aid (Exhibits 6, 12). CSM Bolyard was lying on his stomach in an awkward position indicating possible spinal injury and struggling to breathe. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) turned CSM Bolyard on his back and began the Massive Hemorrhaging, Airway, Respiration, Circulation, and Hypothermia (MARCH) process, which is a casualty assessment method. They noticed an entry wound, with minimal bleeding, in CSM Bolyard's upper middle back when they turned him back to his stomach to check for hemorrhaging. At that point, (b)(3), (b)(6) applied a chest seal over the wound. (Exhibits 6, 12).

(2) (U//FOUO) The Advisors then rolled CSM Bolyard onto his back to check for respiration, and noticed he was experiencing continued issues with his breathing. They also observed unevenness in the chest cavity, indicating a collapsed lung. At this point, (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at the scene and tried to keep CSM Bolyard lucid. (Exhibits 3, 6, 12). (b)(3), (b)(6) with the QRF, arrived and (b)(3), (b)(6) quickly briefed him on his assessment of CSM Bolyard's injuries. (Exhibits 3, 6, 10, 12). (b)(3), (b)(6) then utilized a needle decompression and provided a manual respirator Bag Valve Mask (BVM) to (b)(3), (b)(6) who immediately used it to aid CSM Bolyard's breathing. (Exhibits 6, 10).

(3) (U//FOUO) CSM Bolyard was loaded onto a medical litter and then moved approximately 400 meters by foot to AP CASA. It was determined that foot movement to AP CASA would be much quicker, as the casualty evacuation vehicle would have to maneuver around FOB Maiwand's perimeter and navigate through narrow roads and alleys to get to the incident site. (b)(3), (b)(6) continuously used the manual respirator during the foot movement and (b)(3), (b)(6) constantly monitored CSM Bolyard's vitals. (Exhibits 6, 10). Upon arrival to AP CASA, CSM Bolyard was loaded onto the MAXXPOR vehicle for transport to the FST. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) remained with CSM Bolyard and administered two person CPR throughout the duration of the trip. They continued the compressions while the surgical team began treatment at the FST. (Exhibits 6, 10).

(4) (U//FOUO) CSM Bolyard arrived at the FST on Dahlke-East at 1238 and received care from the FST. (b)(3), (b)(6) CSM Bolyard sustained a gunshot wound to the right posterior chest with no exit wound and on arrival had no pulse and no cardiac activity on the ultrasound. (b)(3), (b)(7)a attempted to stop the bleeding, transfuse, and restart his heart, which met with negative results. (b)(3), (b)(6) pronounced CSM Bolyard's death at 1324. (Exhibits 22, 34).

g. (U//FOUO) Were there any significant delays in the medical process? If there were any significant delays in the process, discuss whether or not it affected CSM Bolyard's outcome.

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(1) (U//FOUO) There were no significant delays in the medical process. CSM Bolyard received almost immediate aid from (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) at the incident site. (Exhibits 6, 12). (b)(3), (b)(6) further assessed CSM Bolyard and quickly decided to evacuate him to the FST. (Exhibits 6, 10, 12). It was determined that movement by foot to AP CASA would be the quickest option. (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) provided care and monitoring during the foot movement to AP CASA. (Exhibits 3, 6, 10, 12, 13, 28). CSM Bolyard was placed in the MAXXPROM for transport to the FST upon arrival at AP CASA. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) performed two-person CPR enroute. (Exhibits 6, 10). (b)(3), (b)(6) and her team provided immediate care and attention to CSM Bolyard upon his arrival at the FST. (Exhibits 22, 34).

h. (U//FOUO) What medical treatment, if any, did (b)(3), (b)(6) receive? Include specific details related to the medical assistance provided at the scene and where he was taken after the incident.

(1) (U//FOUO) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Exhibits 3, 6, 10, 28, 35).

(2) (U//FOUO) (b)(3), (b)(6) continued his (b)(3), (b)(6) detail and assisted with security during the ground movement back to AP CASA. While 3/1 SFAB conducted accountability and sensitive item inventory, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

to

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Exhibits 20, 23).

(3) (U//FOUO) (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at the FST at 1419 and was immediately seen by (b)(3), (b)(6) and her team. A Military Acute Concussion Evaluation (MACE) was conducted. They determined that (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(Exhibit 35).

10. (U//FOUO) **Recommendations.** In view of the above findings, I recommend that:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6
Investigation, Green-on-Blue Attack, on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Maiwand,
Afghanistan, 3 September 2018

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation, Green-on-Blue Attack, on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Maiwand, Afghanistan, 3 September 2018

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) Share the results of this investigation with the Military Advisor Training Academy, Fort Benning, Georgia, to be used for future advisor and CA training.

11. (U//~~FOUO~~) The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) @mail.smil.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~